In 1985, the 2nd edition of ‘The Oil and
Gas Lease in Canada by Mr. John B. Ballem,
Q.C. was published. In his book Mr. Ballem
re-iterated his previous calls for a “‘standard’ oil and gas lease which
would adequately protect the position of the oil company while at the
same time treating the mineral owner fairly”1. In response to Mr. Ballem’s suggestion,
a joint committee of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen (the “CAPL”) and the Natural Resources Section of
the Canadian Bar Association was formed. In 1988, this joint committee
released a standard form of freehold lease agreement for use in Canada known as CAPL 88.
The royalty clause in the CAPL 88 lease
provides that the oil company-lessee “shall pay to the freehold
owner-lessor a royalty in an amount equal to the current market
value at the wellhead as and when produced of _________ percent
(__%) of all the leased substances produced, saved and sold
...” and that “The Lessor shall bear its reasonable proportion of any expense
incurred by the Lessee for separating, treating, processing
and transportation to the point of sale beyond the point of
measurement.” Subsequent to the release of CAPL 88, some freehold
owner-lessors began to receive invoices
for gas gathering and processing costs, rather than royalty
checks from their oil company-lessees - the ‘reasonable’ costs
to make their gas market-ready apparently exceeded the market
value of their gas. The obvious conundrum of oil companies,
the sometimes champions of profit as the only necessary social
motivator, selling gas at an apparent loss can easily be explained
- the costs to make gas ‘market ready’ are not real costs but
include intangibles such as an allowance for overhead and a
‘reasonable’ return on the capital invested in the facilities
necessary to make the gas ‘market ready’. While a freeholder
might consider it ‘reasonable’ to get a 7% rate of return on
his investments, some oil companies consider 30% or more reasonable
for their investments. In 1989, Alberta’s Energy Minister wrote
to the principle industry associations suggesting that the industry
develop a “system of peer arbitration” which would resolve the
problem without requiring regulatory intervention2 (“Deductions from Freehold Royalties”).
No system of peer arbitration was forthcoming
but, in 1991, a new form of CAPL lease known as CAPL 91 was released
for use. CAPL 91 introduced the use of a negotiated cap on the amount
that could be deducted by the oil company-lessee in making the leased
substances market ready: “... the royalty payable to the Lessor
hereunder shall not be less than ________ percent (__%) of the royalty
that would have been payable to the Lessor
if no such expenses had been incurred by the Lessee.”
The ‘Suspended Wells’ clause in CAPL 91
is identical to the clause in CAPL 88 and provides that: “If,
at the expiration of the primary term or at any time or times
thereafter, there is any well on the said lands, the pooled
lands, or the unitized lands, capable of producing the leased
substances or any of them, and all such wells are shut-in or
suspended, this Lease shall, nevertheless, continue in force
as though operations were being conducted on the said lands,
for so long as all the said wells are shut-in or suspended ...”
Almost any well in Alberta is ‘capable of producing’ some gas
and many oil companies interpret the suspended well clause in
CAPL 88 and CAPL 91 literally so as to allow them to continue
a freeholder’s lease indefinitely as long as they have run production
casing in a well bore on the lands (“Shut-in Wells”).
The CAPL 99 lease, released for use in
late 2000, addresses the inequity fostered by the Suspended Wells clause
in prior CAPL lease forms. CAPL 99 effectively provides that if a well
completed for and capable of production of leased substances is shut
in and has not produced for at least 720 hours in any year after the
primary term, the oil company lessee shall pay to the freehold owner-lessor
a shut-in well payment equal to the original bonus consideration for
the lease divided by the number of years in the primary term.
In FHOA’s view,
the CAPL 99 lease is preferable to CAPL 91 from the standpoint
of freehold owners because of the more lessor-friendly
Suspended Wells clause and because CAPL 99 addresses the issue
of diagonal offset drainage. It should be emphasized however
that you must negotiate a short primary term and a reasonable
lease payment in a CAPL 99 lease in order for the Suspended
Well clause to have any material impact in preventing your lands
from being held indefinitely for speculative purposes, and that
you should consider modifying CAPL 99 to more fully protect
your interests (“Understanding Your Lease Agreement - CAPL Leases”,
“Suggested Modifications - CAPL 99").
Almost two years after CAPL 99 was approved
for use by the Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen,
some land agents still profess to have never heard of it.
Other land agents claim that their oil company clients will
only enter into CAPL 88 leases. If the land agent that approaches
you to lease your lands presents you with a CAPL 88 lease for
execution, the Freehold Owners Association recommends that you
politely send him on his way with an unsigned lease. If the
land agent presents you with a CAPL 91 lease for execution and
advises you that his oil company-client will absolutely not
enter into a CAPL 99 lease, FHOA recommends that you amend the
CAPL 91 lease form ("CAPL 91 Suggested
Modification”).
Freehold owners should recognize that convincing
a land agent, or the oil company that the agent represents,
to accept an amendment to a CAPL lease form may be more difficult
than negotiating a higher royalty rate or bonus consideration.
In many instances a land agent and his contact at the oil company
he represents will have been provided with an upper limit by
company management for the bonus considerations, primary terms,
royalty rates and processing caps to be negotiated in freehold
leases. The job of a land agent is to secure a lease of your
mineral interests at the lowest cost to his client, consequently
the initial offer seldom represents the company’s upper limit
and the agent or his oil company contact generally has the authority
to accept a counteroffer. But land agents seldom have authority
to amend the form of freehold lease used by an oil company.
This authority often rests with the company’s upper management.
Landmen dealing with requests to amend
freehold lease agreements are sometimes reluctant to involve
senior management in their relatively insignificant problems.
Oftentimes your request for an amendment, although eminently
reasonable, never crosses the desk of anyone with the authority
to approve it.
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